Rich communication, social motivations, and coordinated resistance against divide-and-conquer: A laboratory investigation

Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui

European Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 37, issue C, 146-159

Abstract: This paper presents a laboratory experiment to investigate how social motivations and free-form communication (Rich Communication) can facilitate coordinated resistance against divide-and-conquer transgressions. In our experiment, a leader first decides whether to extract surplus from a victim and shares it with a beneficiary. We find that the successful joint resistance rate increases almost four-fold (from 15 to 58%) when moving from more restrictive communication treatments to Rich Communication. We also find that the significant impacts of Rich Communication are driven more by the responders' ability to send free-form messages rather than the multiple and iterative opportunities to indicate intentions.

Keywords: Rich Communication; Coordinated resistance; Laboratory experiment; Content analysis; Divide-and-conquer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Working Paper: Rich Communication, Social Motivations, and Coordinated Resistance against Divide-and-Conquer: A Laboratory Investigation (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:146-159

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.10.005

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