Between centralized and decentralized welfare policy: Have national guidelines constrained the influence of local preferences?
Trond Erik Lunder
European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 41, issue C, 1-13
Abstract:
Decentralized welfare services allow more flexibility toward individual needs assessment, but may also have negative consequences such as welfare competition or lack of equity between regions. Does national standardization require full centralization of individual assessment, or can a set of unbinding national guidelines reduce unwanted variation between regions? The case of this article is a national benefit norm for municipal social assistance payments issued by the Norwegian central government in 2001. A large share of municipalities changed their local norms to match the national norm in the following years, but data show that local benefit norms are uncorrelated with the actual payments. The apparent compliance to national guidelines does not translate into actual welfare generosity.
Keywords: Welfare benefits; Policy implementation; National guidelines; Fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 D78 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:41:y:2016:i:c:p:1-13
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.11.003
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