Is centralization a solution to the soft budget constraint problem?

Avi Ben-Bassat, Momi Dahan and Esteban Klor

European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 45, issue C, 57-75

Abstract: This paper focuses on the centralization program implemented in Israel in 2004 to analyze whether the administrative subordination of municipalities is an effective policy to deal with problems related to soft-budget constraint of lower level governments. The results consistently show, for different specifications and samples of municipalities, that this program brought a substantial decrease of municipalities’ expenditures (mostly because of decreases in salary payments), and an increase of local property tax collection. Our analysis shows that all of the fiscal impact of the program is due to the appointment of an accountant that reports directly to the central government, a relatively mild form of administrative subordination. In contrast, more intrusive forms of subordination, like the central imposition of a recovery program, do not result in any substantial improvement of municipalities’ fiscal situation. This leads us to conclude that a mild form of administrative subordination is an effective tool to cope with problems related to soft-budget constraints, whereas political subordination is not an effective tool to reach that goal.

Keywords: Soft budget constraints; Centralization; Local government; Bailout program; Hierarchical subordination; Political institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Is Centralization a Solution to the Soft Budget Constraint Problem? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:45:y:2016:i:c:p:57-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.09.005

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