Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations

Athanassios Pitsoulis and Soeren Schwuchow

European Journal of Political Economy, 2017, vol. 48, issue C, 40-53

Abstract: Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek government in the months before the deal had been erratic and lacked coordination. In this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek leaders, including asking the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can be rationally explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at getting a better bailout deal.

Keywords: Greek debt crisis; Brinkmanship; Crisis management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E65 H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:48:y:2017:i:c:p:40-53

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011

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