Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

Sylvester Eijffinger, Ronald Mahieu and Louis Raes

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 51, issue C, 107-120

Abstract: We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

Keywords: Voting records; Central banking; Committees; Ideal points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 E58 E59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Inferring hawks and doves from voting records (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:107-120

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

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