Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank

Henry Chappell and Rob Roy McGregor

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 53, issue C, 120-133

Abstract: Many central banks now publish transcripts or summaries of meeting discussions and record policy preferences of individual members of policymaking committees. We present an econometric model of committee decisions for Sweden's Riksbank that uses individual preference data pooled over committee members and meetings. Estimates indicate that members attach a small weight to their own preferences when voting; instead, members tend to defer to the perceived committee consensus. These results contrast with some previous findings that members deferred to the committee chairman when voting.

Keywords: C23 – Panel Data Models; E52 – Monetary Policy; E58 – Central Banks and Their Policies; Monetary policy; Central banking; Incidental parameters; Committee decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:53:y:2018:i:c:p:120-133

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.07.005

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