Market and political power interactions in Greece: A theory

Tryphon Kollintzas (), Dimitris Papageorgiou and Vanghelis Vassilatos

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 53, issue C, 59-83

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a neoclassical growth model of market and political power interactions that captures the main features of the economic and political system of Greece and explains the weak economic growth of Greece in the last forty years. The model incorporates the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government. Outsiders form a group of workers that supply labor to a competitive private sector. And, insiders form a group of workers that enjoy market power in supplying labor to the public sector and influence the policy decisions of government, including those that affect the development and maintenance of public sector infrastructures. This leads to labor misallocation and inefficient fiscal policies. Thus, even though expanding public sector output has a positive effect on growth, eventually this is counterbalanced by the labor misallocation and inefficient tax policy outcomes leading to a growth reversal phenomenon. The model proposed in this paper may be applicable to other countries that have a similar politicoeconomic structure with Greece, namely other Southern European countries.

Keywords: Insiders - outsiders; Politicoeconomic equilibrium; Taxation; Fiscal policy; Growth; Greek crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J45 O43 O52 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Market and Political Power Interactions in Greece: A Theory (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:53:y:2018:i:c:p:59-83

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.07.003

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