Tax morale, aversion to ethnic diversity, and decentralization

Alessandro Belmonte, Roberto Dell'Anno and Désirée Teobaldelli

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 55, issue C, 204-223

Abstract: This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the relationship between individuals' aversion to ethnic diversity, the degree of fiscal and political decentralization, and tax morale. We present a model showing how higher degrees of individuals' aversion to ethnic diversity may reduce tax morale and why this effects may be smaller in decentralized political and fiscal systems. We test these results by using individual data from the World Value Survey and several measures of decentralization. Our estimates robustly confirm that higher degrees of individuals' aversion to ethnic diversity are associated to lower tax morale and that this correlation is smaller or null in decentralized systems.

Keywords: Tax morale; Aversion to ethnic diversity; Decentralization; Ethnic fragmentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H73 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Tax Morale, Aversion to Ethnic Diversity, and Decentralization (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:204-223

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.12.004

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