Economics at your fingertips  

Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power

Pim Heijnen () and Lambert Schoonbeek

European Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 56, issue C, 103-114

Abstract: We consider a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest with uncertain discriminatory power in the contest success function. We examine the cases where both players are either informed or uninformed about the size of the discriminatory power, as well as the case where only one player has private information about it. We show that in all three cases the contest has a unique (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. In each case we characterize key properties of the equilibrium.

Keywords: Rent-seeking contest; Discriminatory power; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2019-10-12
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:56:y:2019:i:c:p:103-114