Independent fiscal councils: Recent trends and performance
Roel Beetsma,
Xavier Debrun,
Xiangming Fang,
Young Kim,
Victor Lledó,
Samba Mbaye and
Xiaoxiao Zhang
European Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 57, issue C, 53-69
Abstract:
Countries increasingly rely on independent fiscal councils to constrain policymakers’ discretion and curb the bias towards excessive deficits and pro-cyclical policies. Since fiscal councils are often recent and heterogeneous across countries, assessing their impact is challenging. Using the latest (2016) vintage of the IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, we focus on two tasks expected to strengthen fiscal performance: the preparation or assessment of forecasts, and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules. Tentative econometric evidence suggests that the presence of a fiscal council is associated with more accurate and possibly less optimistic fiscal forecasts, as well as greater compliance with fiscal rules.
Keywords: Independent fiscal councils; Fiscal rule compliance; Fiscal forecasts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 E62 H11 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)
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Working Paper: Independent fiscal councils: recent trends and performance (2018) 
Working Paper: Independent Fiscal Councils: Recent Trends and Performance (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:53-69
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.004
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