Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

Giuseppe Albanese, Marika Cioffi and Pietro Tommasino

European Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 59, issue C, 423-444

Abstract: We explore how electoral rules and the degree of civicness of the voters interact in shaping elected officials' behaviour. We examine the expenditure proposals sponsored by Italian Senators from 1994 to 2013 and exploit the 2005 electoral reform that transformed a mainly majoritarian system into a mainly proportional one. First, we find that legislators elected in first-past-the-post districts are more likely to sponsor pork-barrel bills and to put effort into legislative activity than those elected with a closed-list proportional system. Second, more importantly, we show that the effects of the electoral rules are muted in areas with high civicness.

Keywords: Electoral rules; Provision of public goods; Political economy; Civicness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: evidence from an Italian reform (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:423-444

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.05.005

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