Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation

Gil Epstein and Ira Gang

European Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 60, issue C

Abstract: Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the taxes they pay the government. We examine the political economy of a decentralised revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralised with decentralised governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by constituencies trying to affect government taxation decisions.

Keywords: Governance; Decentralisation; Economic-models-of-political-processes; Contests; Rent-seeking; Intergovernmental-relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H73 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:60:y:2019:i:c:s0176268017303142

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.08.007

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