European development banks and the political cycle
Marco Frigerio and
European Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 62, issue C
This paper investigates whether the lending activity of European development banks is affected by opportunistic political behavior, by looking at the change in loans extended by these entities in election years. The empirical analysis leverages on a unique manually collected dataset that includes all the development banks headquartered in Europe, for the period 2002–2015.
Keywords: Development banking; Ownership; Lending; Political interference; Political business cycle; JEL codes; O16; L32; G21; D72; G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:62:y:2020:i:c:s0176268019305051
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