Terrorist training: Onsite or via the Internet?

Kevin Siqueira and Daniel Arce

European Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 63, issue C

Abstract: This paper investigates an agency model of a terrorist organization in which the training and motivation of recruits can occur onsite, in physical training camps, or at arm’s length through the Internet. In so doing, we develop measures of the effectiveness and efficacy of these recruit training methods. A dividing line for choosing between the two is characterized in terms of the degree to which onsite training augments an operative’s probability of mission success. In comparing our results to data on terror-tactic lethality, one implication is that terrorist organizations are likely to consider Internet training as sufficient for any tactic that is less complex and less lethal than vehicular assaults, and will require onsite motivation and training for more complex missions such as multiple-operative mass shootings and suicide bombings.

Keywords: Terrorism; Incentives; Training and motivation; Counterterrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D74 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300264

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101878

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