Rank effect in bureaucrat recruitment
Alvaro Miranda and
European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 68, issue C
Bureaucrats are a crucial part of states, but only recently has a pioneer literature focused on the determinants of their recruitment. In this article, we study the role of rank in bureaucratic selection in the context of the Chilean civil service, where a decision maker (the President or agency director) chooses a candidate from a shortlist ranked according to a final interview score. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document that first-place candidates have a large advantage in the probability of being selected for top positions in the public sector relative to those in second place. In contrast, all other ranks seem to be irrelevant. Our results are robust to the use of several methods of estimation that take into account the discrete nature of the running variable. Moreover, the effect is associated with a selection process with low levels of competition and low-quality final candidates.
Keywords: Bureaucrats; Civil service system; Rank effect; Regression discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 J45 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020301439
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung
More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().