How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea

Francesco Lagona and Fabio Padovano

European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 69, issue C

Abstract: The Political Legislation Cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when legislators focus on voters’ welfare to be reelected. This paper verifies the theory on South Korean legislative production (1948–2016); it is the first test of the theory in a country undergoing a process of democratization, thus providing evidence relevant also for the conditional political cycles literature. Two insofar untested hypotheses are verified: 1) peaks of legislative production should increase with the degree of democracy; 2) as the party system and the mechanisms of legislative checks and balances develop, the PLC should become more evident in bills of legislative rather than executive’s initiative. A hurdle model estimated on both laws of parliamentary proposal and of government assignment lends empirical support to both hypotheses, with the noticeable feature that PLC in Korea appear more in the form of an upward trend than of pre-electoral peaks.

Keywords: Political legislation cycles; Conditional political cycles; Democratic transition; Autocracy; Executive vs. parliamentary legislative initiative; Hurdle model; Zero inflation; Over-dispersion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C49 D72 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:69:y:2021:i:c:s0176268021000276

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102026

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