Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy

Enrico Cantoni, Ludovica Gazzè and Jerome Schafer

European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 70, issue C

Abstract: We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences-in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political parties and lower levels of social capital.

Keywords: Turnout; Concurrent elections; Regression discontinuity design; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Turnout in Concurrent Elections: Evidence from Two Quasi-Experiments in Italy (2021)
Working Paper: Turnout in Concurrent Elections: Evidence from Two Quasi-Experiments in Italy (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:70:y:2021:i:c:s0176268021000367

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102035

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