The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers

Philippe van Gruisen and Christophe Crombez

European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 70, issue C

Abstract: This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whether the Presidency's role limits or expands the Commission's powers. We find that even though the Commission has lost powers as a result of the introduction and extension of the codecision procedure, as shown in the literature, it maintains a degree of legislative power by strategically using the rotating Presidency. In particular the Commission times its proposals. It formulates a proposal on an issue when the Presidency is close to itself on that issue.

Keywords: Legislative powers; Institutions; Spatial models; Political economy; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:70:y:2021:i:c:s0176268021000410

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102040

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