 Politics of trade protection in an autocracy: Evidence from an EU tariff liberalization in MoroccoChristian Ruckteschler, Adeel Malik and Ferdinand Eibl European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 71, issue C Abstract: Although non-tariff measures (NTMs) have surpassed tariffs as the most prevalent instrument of trade protection globally, our knowledge of what drives these NTMs is extremely limited. This paper sheds light on the political determinants of non-tariff protection using a rich empirical setting in Morocco. Taking advantage of a bilateral EU-Morocco trade agreement that resulted in an across-the-board tariff cut and a subsequent rise in NTMs, we use a difference-in-differences regression framework to show that sectors with close prior political connections to the royal family received disproportionately higher levels of non-tariff protection after the EU Agreement than unconnected sectors. We also demonstrate that, in the wake of the EU-induced tariff cut, connected sectors were mainly compensated through technical barriers to trade that depend on administrative oversight and are vulnerable to political influence. Keywords: Politically connected firms; Non-tariff measures; Trade liberalization; Free trade agreements; Corruption; Middle East and North Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:71:y:2022:i:c:s0176268021000598 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102063 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.