The anomalous electoral advantage: Evidence from over 17,000 mayoral candidacies in Poland

Sławomir Bartnicki, Maciej Alimowski and Maciej A. Górecki

European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 72, issue C

Abstract: Relying on a dataset covering mayoral elections in Poland held over the period 2006–2018, we contribute to the ongoing debate on the anomalous sources of advantage enjoyed by certain candidates contesting close electoral races. While our analysis lends support to earlier conjectures that such anomalies tend to be confined to small jurisdictions, we also point to context-specific clientelistic strategies behind the anomalous advantage. The last is driven largely by an experience of holding a mayoral office in the 1990s, an era when Polish mayors were elected by local councils rather than directly by citizens. When interpreting these findings, we emphasize fundamental characteristics of post-transition Polish local democracy, including feudal legacy, pauperization of the electorate and decentralization of public spending.

Keywords: Electoral advantage; Mayoral elections; Clientelism; Cronyism; Regression discontinuity design; Poland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:72:y:2022:i:c:s0176268021000951

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102109

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