Crime and social expenditure: A political economic approach

Carlos Bethencourt

European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 75, issue C

Abstract: High-income and less unequal societies are associated with both lower rates of economic crimes and larger public programs to deter crime. This paper suggests that redistributive effects generated by a crime-control program help to explain these facts. Retirees and honest individuals are beneficiaries of the system because they do not offend. Despite paying more taxes, high-income dishonest agents become net receivers, as they devote relatively less time to criminal activities than poorer agents; thus, a regressive intra-generational redistributive effect arises. Consequently, a crime-control program may be politically supported by a coalition of retirees, honest individuals and high-income dishonest young agents.

Keywords: Crime; Overlapping generations model; Inequality; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H53 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:75:y:2022:i:c:s0176268022000040

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102183

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