Political polarization and international cooperation
Carsten Hefeker and
Michael Neugart
European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 78, issue C
Abstract:
We analyze the consequences of political polarization between domestic policymakers for international policy coordination or delegation to a common agency. Coordination is preferred under political polarization if it allows to constrain the policy of policymakers with different policy targets, while delegation allows to determine policies in the future by selecting the appropriate agent. Policymakers have different preferences concerning international coordination and which form it should take. These differences are increasing in political polarization. They agree on delegation if election outcomes are close to being random.
Keywords: Political polarization; International cooperation; Delegation; Electoral uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D78 F42 F55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Political polarization and international cooperation (2023) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:78:y:2023:i:c:s0176268023000459
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102401
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