Comparative politics with intraparty candidate selection
Benoit Crutzen and
Nicolas Sahuguet
European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 79, issue C
Abstract:
Politicians respond to incentives when they decide how to allocate their campaigning time and effort. The literature suggests electoral rules impact politicians’ incentives. We argue that the candidate selection process is an equally important source of incentives. We develop a two-stage model in which parties select candidates before the election. Elections are under first past the post (FPTP) or closed list proportional representation (PR). Selection is competitive or non-competitive. When selection is not competitive, effort is higher under FPTP. With competitive selection, effort is higher under PR as, under PR, competition motivates candidates to exert effort to be selected (as under FPTP) and to be ranked higher on the list. The results point to a causal relationship between electoral rules and how parties organize. They suggest empirical studies comparing electoral rules should consider how parties organize.
Keywords: Candidate selection process; Electoral rule; Comparative Politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection (2022) 
Working Paper: Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:79:y:2023:i:c:s0176268023000897
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102445
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