 Gloomy future, gloomy sky: Promotion incentives and pollution in ChinaChang Xue and Xiaoyu Zhang European Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 81, issue C Abstract: The career prospects of politicians can significantly influence their policy decisions, including those related to environmental protection. This study examines how promotion incentives affect environmental outcomes by analyzing prefectural pollution and personnel data in China from 2003 to 2017. The research indicates that the promotion prospects of prefecture party secretaries were negatively affected by changes in their social networks with the transition of power. The difference-in-differences analyses, using the power transition as a shock, reveal that sulfur dioxide emissions significantly increased in prefectures governed by secretaries who had lost their connections. This was due to a decrease in officials' motivation to prioritize environmental protection, owing to their slim chances of promotion. The possibility of an increase in pollution as a result of growth competition is ruled out. The mechanism is demonstrated through text analysis of local governments' annual work reports. Keywords: Promotion incentive; Air pollution; Local government policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:81:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000065 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102504 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier |
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