Bargaining around cost–benefit standards
Ehud Guttel and
Shmuel Leshem
Journal of Public Economics, 2013, vol. 103, issue C, 55-67
Abstract:
Injurers often purchase the property of potential victims to avoid liability or to comply with regulations. This paper shows that injurers subject to cost–benefit standards could profit from buying out victims even if they attach no value to the victims' property. Because buyouts allow injurers to take fewer precautions, a buyout of one victim produces a negative externality for the remaining victims. Injurers can consequently exploit victims, and thereby reduce social welfare, by adopting a “divide-and-conquer” strategy or by negotiating with victims sequentially. Perhaps surprisingly, buyouts may reduce social welfare and victims' joint profits even if victims make simultaneous or sequential take-it-or-leave-it buyout demands to the injurer.
Keywords: Cost–benefit standards; Divide and conquer; Negative externalities; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:103:y:2013:i:c:p:55-67
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.03.004
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