Consumer biases and mutual ownership

Ryan Bubb and Alex Kaufman

Journal of Public Economics, 2013, vol. 105, issue C, 39-57

Abstract: We show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit status, can prevent firms from using contractual terms that take advantage of consumer biases. By eliminating an outside residual claimant with control over the firm, these alternatives to investor ownership reduce the incentive of the firm to offer such terms. However, customers who are unaware of their behavioral biases may fail to recognize this advantage of non-investor-owned firms. We present evidence from the consumer financial services market that supports our theory. Comparing contract terms, we find that mutually owned firms offer lower penalties, such as default interest rates, and higher up-front prices, such as introductory interest rates, than do investor-owned firms. However, consumers most vulnerable to these penalties are no more likely to use mutually owned firms.

Keywords: Consumer biases; Mutual ownership; Nonprofits; Credit unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D18 G21 G32 K22 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272713001266
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:39-57

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.002

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).