(Un)Informed charitable giving
Silvana Krasteva and
Huseyin Yildirim
Journal of Public Economics, 2013, vol. 106, issue C, 14-26
Abstract:
Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent private values that can be ascertained at a cost. We find that an individual who considers a smaller contribution is less likely to learn her value, and thus the percentage of informed giving diminishes as the population grows. We also find that a direct grant to the charity exacerbates crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition whereas a matching grant increases donations by encouraging it. We further show that with costly information, a (first-order) stochastic increase in values can decrease donations; and that facilitating private acquisition of information can be a better fund-raising strategy than directly supplying it.
Keywords: Charitable giving; Value of information; Crowding-out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 H00 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:106:y:2013:i:c:p:14-26
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.011
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