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“Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation

Ernesto Dal Bó and Pedro Dal Bó

Journal of Public Economics, 2014, vol. 117, issue C, 28-38

Abstract: The use of moral appeals to affect the behavior of others is pervasive (from the pulpit to ethics classes) but little is known about the effects of moral suasion on behavior. In a series of experiments we study whether moral suasion affects behavior in voluntary contribution games and the mechanisms by which behavior is altered. We find that observing a message with a moral standard according to the golden rule or, alternatively, utilitarian philosophy, results in a significant but transitory increase in contributions above the levels observed for subjects that did not receive a message or received a message that advised them to contribute without a moral rationale. When players have the option of punishing each other after the contribution stage, the effect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation. We also investigate the mechanisms through which moral suasion operates and find that it affects both expectations and preferences.

Keywords: Moral suasion; Morality; Cooperation; Public goods; Ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: "Do the Right Thing:" The Effects of Moral Suasion on Cooperation (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:117:y:2014:i:c:p:28-38

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.05.002

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