Soothing politics
Raphaël Levy
Journal of Public Economics, 2014, vol. 120, issue C, 126-133
Abstract:
We consider a political agency model where voters learn information about some policy-relevant variable, which they can ignore when it impedes their desire to hold optimistic beliefs. Voters' excessive tendency to sustain optimism may result in inefficient political decision-making because political courage does not pay off when voters have poor information. However, voters infer information from policies and incentives to ignore bad news decrease when policy-making is more efficient. This generates multiple equilibria: an equilibrium where voters face up to the reality and politicians have political support to implement optimal policies, and another where they shy away from reforms to cater to the electorate's demand for soothing policies.
Keywords: Political economy of reforms; Political agency; Selective memory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:120:y:2014:i:c:p:126-133
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.09.003
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