To commit or not to commit? An experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information
Sönke Hoffmann,
Benedikt Mihm and
Joachim Weimann
Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 121, issue C, 95-105
Abstract:
In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral motivations other than payoff-maximization affect the strength of the model's result.
Keywords: Pre-commitments; Bargaining; Asymmetric information; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272714002278
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:121:y:2015:i:c:p:95-105
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.11.005
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba
More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().