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To commit or not to commit? An experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information

Sönke Hoffmann, Benedikt Mihm and Joachim Weimann

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 121, issue C, 95-105

Abstract: In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral motivations other than payoff-maximization affect the strength of the model's result.

Keywords: Pre-commitments; Bargaining; Asymmetric information; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:121:y:2015:i:c:p:95-105

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.11.005

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