Is more information always better? Party cues and candidate quality in U.S. judicial elections

Claire S.H. Lim and James M. Snyder

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 128, issue C, 107-123

Abstract: We investigate the influence of electoral rules on voting behavior and the quality of judges, using newly collected data on judicial elections and ratings from 39 U.S. states. We find that in partisan elections, where candidates' party affiliations are listed on the ballot, party drives voting behavior and candidate quality has little effect on outcomes. In nonpartisan elections, where party affiliation is not on the ballot, party has a much smaller influence on voting behavior and candidate quality has a substantial effect on outcomes. If the primary task of public officials is not to represent voters' ideology and their decisions have little variability across parties, then we need to seriously consider the potential cost of partisan competition. To the extent that partisan voting behavior crowds out the influence of candidate quality on voting outcomes, the desirability of the partisan election system should be carefully assessed.

Keywords: Voting; Candidate quality; Electoral systems; Judicial selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H70 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:128:y:2015:i:c:p:107-123

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.04.006

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