Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection

Jan Boone

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 128, issue C, 50-58

Abstract: This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.

Keywords: Universal basic health insurance; Voluntary supplementary insurance; Public vs. private insurance; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Cost effectiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H51 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection (2014)
Working Paper: Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
Working Paper: Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:128:y:2015:i:c:p:50-58

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.009

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