Global inspection games

Miguel Sanchez Villalba

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 128, issue C, 59-72

Abstract: In the tax evasion game – a typical example of “inspection game” – audits are costly and audit probabilities are determined by the tax agency based on the tax returns submitted by taxpayers. We find that if taxpayers' incomes are correlated (e.g., when they are subject to a common shock) the optimal audit probability for low declarations is an increasing function of the average declaration, as the latter is an informative signal of the realized level of income. Since a taxpayer's optimal declaration is an increasing function of the probability of an audit, the optimal auditing rule creates incentives for taxpayers to coordinate their declarations. The resulting coordination game features multiplicity of equilibria and thus “strategic uncertainty” about the equilibrium that will be selected.

Keywords: Coordination/global games; Common shocks; Asymmetric information; Expectations; Tax evasion; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 D84 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:128:y:2015:i:c:p:59-72

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.04.009

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