Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks

Sanxi Li, Hailin Sun, Jianye Yan and Jun Yu

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 128, issue C, 96-106

Abstract: This paper investigates the principal's bundling decision during a procurement auction for a project consisting of two sequential tasks, in which task externality exists and information arrives sequentially. We show that, although increasing the number of bidders in the market for the second task always tilts the principal's choice toward unbundling, increasing the number of consortiums that can perform both tasks tilts the principal's preference toward bundling if the externality is negative.

Keywords: Auction; Bundling; Design–bid–build; Design–build; Procurement; Public–private partnerships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 D73 H11 H41 H54 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:128:y:2015:i:c:p:96-106

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.09.012

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