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Voting and optimal provision of a public good

Ran Shao and Lin Zhou

Journal of Public Economics, 2016, vol. 134, issue C, 35-41

Abstract: In this paper, we study the optimal provision of a costly public good using an average efficiency criterion. For every fixed cost, we identify a quota mechanism as the optimal mechanism among those that are dominant-incentive-compatible, deficit-free and kind. Moreover, we also consider the asymmetric case and demonstrate that a committee mechanism is optimal for a large class of mechanisms. In particular, this mechanism dominates all VCG (pivotal) mechanisms.

Keywords: Public good; Mechanisms; Dominant-incentive compatibility; VCG mechanisms; Quotas; Committees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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