The right look: Conservative politicians look better and voters reward it

Niclas Berggren, Henrik Jordahl and Panu Poutvaara

Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 146, issue C, 79-86

Abstract: Since good-looking politicians win more votes, a beauty advantage for politicians on the left or on the right is bound to have political consequences. We show that politicians on the right look more beautiful in Europe, the United States and Australia. Our explanation is that beautiful people earn more, which makes them less inclined to support redistribution. Our model of within-party competition predicts that voters use beauty as a cue for conservatism when they do not know much about candidates and that politicians on the right benefit more from beauty in low-information elections. Evidence from real and experimental elections confirms both predictions.

Keywords: Beauty; Elections; Political candidates; Appearance; Ideology; Parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J45 J70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The right look: Conservative politicians look better and voters reward it (2017)
Working Paper: The Right Look: Conservative Politicians Look Better and Voters Reward It (2015)
Working Paper: The Right Look: Conservative Politicians Look Better and Voters Reward It (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:146:y:2017:i:c:p:79-86

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.12.008

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