Economics at your fingertips  

Knowledge, power, and self-interest

Bernhard Kittel, Georg Kanitsar and Stefan Traub

Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 150, issue C, 39-52

Abstract: The paperreports the results of a laboratory experiment assessing the impact of social position (endowment) and power (structurally advantaged or disadvantaged network positions) on redistributive decisions, which involve a classical efficiency-equality trade-off. The experiment involves three decision conditions: veil of ignorance, informed dictator, and majority vote. We use a three-person social-preference model in order to derive hypotheses on the effect of knowledge and power on tax choices. Our results confirm that disclosing the social position raises the measured self-interest (Knowledge Effect) and that mandating a majority vote results in concessions, the size of which depends on the player's structural position in the network (Power Effect).

Keywords: Redistribution; Power; Self-interest; Inequality; Network; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D63 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2018-01-30
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:39-52