Optimal tax administration

Michael Keen and Joel Slemrod

Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 133-142

Abstract: This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Among the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.

Keywords: Tax administration; Tax compliance; Optimal taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

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Working Paper: Optimal Tax Administration (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Tax Administration (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:133-142

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.04.006

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