Distributional preferences and political behavior

Raymond Fisman, Pamela Jakiela and Shachar Kariv

Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 155, issue C, 1-10

Abstract: We document the relationship between distributional preferences and voting decisions in a large and diverse sample of Americans. Using a generalized dictator game, we generate individual-level measures of fair-mindedness (the weight on oneself versus others) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs. Subjects' equality-efficiency tradeoffs predict their political decisions: equality-focused subjects are more likely to have voted for Barack Obama in 2012, and to be affiliated with the Democratic Party. Our findings shed light on how American voters are motivated by their distributional preferences.

Keywords: Distributional preferences; Social preferences; Fair-mindedness; Self-interest impartiality; Equality; Efficiency; Redistribution; Political decisions; Voting; Party affiliation; American Life Panel (ALP); Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (100)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:1-10

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.08.010

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