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Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

Menusch Khadjavi () and Jasper D. Tjaden

Journal of Public Economics, 2018, vol. 165, issue C, 160-169

Abstract: We examine determinants of immigration requirements in a public goods game experiment with endogenous groups. Initially, the game consists of in-group players who enjoy an existing public good and out-group players who may subsequently enter the group. Motivated by different current migration flows and anti-immigration sentiments, our treatments are crafted to investigate how migrants' power of self-determination and public debate among in-group players shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. In order to immigrate, out-group players have to fulfill minimal contribution requirements. Public debate fosters coherence between the requirements and in-group players' contributions if migrants are free to reject requirements. Conversely, public debate among in-group players fosters economic exploitation of migrants with less bargaining power. Overall the study illustrates the novel potential of applying well-established tools from experimental economics to migration questions.

Keywords: Immigration; Public good; Endogenous groups; Voting; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H41 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Setting the bar - An experimental investigation of immigration requirements (2014) Downloads
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