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Investment ramifications of distortionary tax subsidies

James Hines and Jongsang Park

Journal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 172, issue C, 36-51

Abstract: This paper examines the investment effects of tax subsidies for which some assets and not others are eligible. Distortionary tax subsidies concentrate investments in tax-favored assets, thereby reducing the expected pre-tax profitability of investment and reducing payoffs to bondholders in the event of default. Anticipation of asset substitution encourages lenders to require covenants in debt contracts, which only imperfectly address asset substitution and distort investment. The result is that borrowing is made more expensive, which in turn discourages investment. Borrowing rates can react so strongly that aggregate investment may rise very little, or even fall, in response to higher tax subsidies. Debt issued by U.S. firms in risk of default after the 2002 introduction of bonus depreciation for U.S. equipment investment contained many more covenants than in other periods, a pattern that reversed when bonus depreciation was discontinued after 2004; furthermore, firms at risk of default borrowed less, and were more apt to lease capital, than were other firms during the bonus depreciation period.

Keywords: Investment tax subsidies; Corporate borrowing; Deadweight loss; Debt overhang; Bonus depreciation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G33 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Investment Ramifications of Distortionary Tax Subsidies (1998) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:172:y:2019:i:c:p:36-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.11.002

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