Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection
Ruben Hernandez-Murillo ()
Journal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 173, issue C, 85-95
In this paper, we study the welfare consequences of imposing alternative regimes of competition between two local governments that compete for mobile firms which have private information on their degree of mobility.
Keywords: Interjurisdictional competition; Asymmetric information; Constitutional constraints; Fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H20 H32 H73 R38 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:173:y:2019:i:c:p:85-95
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