Civil service and the growth of government
Jean Guillaume Forand
Journal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 177, issue C, -
Abstract:
I study a model of elections which links the scale of government activity to civil service rules. Without tenure protections, bureaucrats' career prospects are tied to the electoral prospects of the party that hires them. To avoid wasteful partisan spending, voters only consent to minimal taxation. If bureaucrats are protected by tenure, they have no incentive to favour one party over another, and governments only produce public goods. In turn, voters consent to high taxes. However, because higher tax revenues increase the ability of governing parties to co-opt the bureaucracy through favourable compensation, large-scale government activity is accompanied by inefficiently high public-sector wages.
Keywords: Civil service reform; Tenure; Government size; Public goods provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:177:y:2019:i:c:2
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.07.004
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