A taste for taxes: Minimizing distortions using political preferences
Emiliano Huet-Vaughn,
Andrea Robbett and
Matthew Spitzer
Journal of Public Economics, 2019, vol. 180, issue C
Abstract:
We conduct an experiment with online workers to assess whether the distortionary effect of a tax is sensitive to the ideological match between taxpayer and tax expenditures. We find that, among self-identified political moderates, the labor supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax wage is significantly smaller when individuals pay taxes to a favored government agency as compared to an unfavored one. While the tax has a significant distortionary effect in the latter case, with a point estimate for the labor supply elasticity of approximately 0.77, the elasticity point estimate is close to zero when taxes go to a favored agency. There is also an increase in total output for the matched population among moderates. There is no evidence that these effects hold for self-identified liberals or conservatives.
Keywords: Taxes; Labor supply; Efficiency cost of taxation; Experiment; Political preferences; Ideology; Distortion; Expenditures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D03 H21 H50 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272719301161
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: A Taste for Taxes: Minimizing Distortions Using Political Preferences 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:180:y:2019:i:c:s0047272719301161
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104055
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba
More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().