Public employment services under decentralization: Evidence from a natural experiment
Lukas Mergele and
Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 182, issue C
This paper studies whether the decentralization of public employment services (PES) increases job placements among the unemployed. Decentralizing PES has been a widely applied reform used by governments aiming to enhance their efficacy. However, economic theory is ambiguous about its effects, and empirical evidence has been scarce. Using a difference-in-differences design, we exploit unique within-country variation in decentralization provided by the partial devolution of German job centers in 2012. We find that decentralization reduces job placements by approximately 10%. Decentralized providers expand the use of public job creation schemes which diminish job seekers' reemployment prospects but shift costs to higher levels of government.
Keywords: Decentralization; Public employment services; Job placements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H75 I38 J48 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Public Employment Services under Decentralization: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Public employment services under decentralization: evidence from a natural experiment (2017)
Working Paper: Public employment services under decentralization: Evidence from a natural experiment (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:182:y:2020:i:c:s0047272719301756
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