Teacher mobility and merit pay: Evidence from a voluntary public award program
Samuel Berlinski and
Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 186, issue C
This paper analyzes the effect on teacher mobility of a program that rewards excellence in teaching practices in Chile. Successful applicants receive a 6% annual wage increase for up to 10 years and an award that publicly recognizes their excellence. The paper uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of the public merit award. The program does not alter transitions out of teaching. However, it increases the mobility of awardees within the school system. This is consistent with the program providing a credible public signal of teacher quality.
Keywords: Employee turnover rates; Public sector compensation; Teachers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 J45 J63 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720300505
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