Enforcement for sale: Lobbying for water in Pakistan's Indus Basin

Hanan Jacoby and Ghazala Mansuri

Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 190, issue C

Abstract: Surface irrigation is a common pool resource subject to over-exploitation by upstream users. We ask to what extent state enforcement of de jure water allocations, designed to ensure adequate irrigation to downstream users, is up ‘for sale.’ Unique data on the land ownership of nearly a quarter-million irrigators in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin watershed provide a measure of political influence. Consistent with an influence-driven model, the decline in water availability and land values from head to tail is accentuated along channels having greater lobbying power at the head and attenuated along channels having greater lobbying power at the tail. Our paper shows how power disparities can be leveraged through the administrative state to capture valuable common resources.

Keywords: Lobbying; Common property resource; Land inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720301195

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104255

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