Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies

Ascension Andina-Diaz, Francesco Feri and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()

Journal of Public Economics, 2021, vol. 204, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents a novel explanation for political alternation in democracies, rooted in the benefit for the median voter of keeping policy from drifting too far to either extreme. Central to this argument is the idea that policy change is gradual and that this gradualism depends on the institutional flexibility/rigidity of the country. Built on this idea, we propose a model of dynamic elections and show that institutional rigidities cause alternation. We also show that, though institutional rigidities prevent governments from implementing extreme policies, they incentivize parties to polarize as much as they can. However, more flexible institutions can foster moderation. Last, we analyze the resilience of equilibrium policies to players’ impatience and discuss extensions of our model, including office-motivated parties, the cost of alternation, alternation every two terms, and asymmetric policies.

Keywords: Gradual policy implementation; Endogenous status quo; Political alternation; Polarization; Moderation; Efficiency; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Institutional flexibility, political alternation and middle-of-the-road policies (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:204:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721001687

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532

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