Multilateral regime change
Jon Eguia
Journal of Public Economics, 2022, vol. 205, issue C
Abstract:
I present a theory of policy-motivated multilateral conflict. Consider an environment in which a “Target”country implements domestic policies that other countries find harmful. Any sufficiently powerful country can launch an intervention in the Target country to replace its regime and its policies, and any country can support or oppose any intervention. Istudy the decisions to intervene, and to support or oppose each intervention. The theory delivers intuitive comparative statics: an intervention is more likely in a more interconnected world, if the Target nation is smaller, or if the policy preferred by the Target’s government is more extreme. To measure the effectiveness of alliances, Idevelop a measure of “relative sacrifice”in contributions to multilateral interventions. Using Afghanistan (2001–2014) as an illustration, Iargue that the relative sacrifice made by the US, the UK, and Canada was high, while all other European NATOallies sacrificed little.
Keywords: Multilateral conflict; Regime change; Policy-motivated conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:205:y:2022:i:c:s0047272721001985
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104562
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