Technological change, campaign spending and polarization
Pau Balart,
Agustin Casas and
Orestis Troumpounis
Journal of Public Economics, 2022, vol. 211, issue C
Abstract:
We present a model of electoral competition with endogenous platforms and campaign spending where the division of voters between impressionable and ideological is also endogenous and depends on parties’ strategic platform choices. Our approach results in a tractable model that provides interesting comparative statics on the effect of recent technological advancements. For instance, we can accommodate a new justification behind the well-documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization: an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising, or a decrease in the electorate’s political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending.
Keywords: Electoral competition; Office motives; Endogenous valence; Campaign spending; Impressionable voters; Semiorder lexicographic preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272722000688
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization (2022) 
Working Paper: Technological change, campaign spending and polarization (2019) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:211:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722000688
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104666
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba
More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().